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In three experiments we auempted to extend the cognitive-effort account of

depressive defc
i its in memory to naturally depressed college students. This ac
co,mt maintains that depression reduces allentional resources, thereby impairing
performance on demanding tash, and has received support through experimen
tal inductions of depressed moods. Nondepressed, naturally depressed, and (in
Experiment 2) experimentally depressed college students performed unan
nounced tests of free recall following learning lash with two levels of difficulty
and (in Experiment 2) two degrees of structure. In Experiments 1 and 2 we
measured cognitive effort on those tasks via latencies on a secondmy task.
Latencies and subsequent recall increased with the structure and diT
J iculty of
the learning task for nondepressed and naturally depressed subjects, but these
effects were reduced or absent for experimentally depressed subjects. When the
secon dwy task was omitted (Experiment 3), naturally depressed students still
recalled without a deficit. We discuss possible differences associated with the
two types of depression and implications for the cognitive-effort acco11nt.
KEY WORDS: depression; memory; recall; difficulty.
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Sad moods and depression are frequently associated with difficulties
in remembering. The most common account of these difficulties relates
them to corresponding deficiencies in the allocation of attentional resources
(see Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Roy-Byrne, Wein
gartner, Bierer, Thompson, & Post, 1986). We refer to this general view
as the cognitive-effort account of depressive deficits in memory.
The cognitive-effort account maintains that depression reduces or
uses a portion of the limited capacity of conscious attention that would
otherwise be allocated to a particular cognitive task. Depressive deficits
should occur, therefore, in relatively attention-demanding tasks or in tasks
that benefit from prior effortful procedures (such as free recall). The ac
count implies that this drain or occupation of attentional resources by
depression is pervasive and relatively constant. Other tasks are assumed to
suffer to the extent that they require more attention than remains.
The cognitive-effort account has received support in experiments in
which nondepressed students have been experimentally induced to feel
depressed (see Ellis, Thomas, & Rodriguez, 1984), but only mixed support
in experiments performed with naturally depressed students. For example,
Potts, Camp, and Coyne (1989) attempted to replicate the results of Ellis
et al. (1984, Experiment 1), but failed to find an overall depressive deficit
in recalling words processed in base or elaborated sentences. The experi
ments described here were attempts to extend the results from experimen
tally induced depression in Ellis et al. ( 1984, Experiment 3) to the domain
of naturally depressed students and thereby to provide support for the cog
nitive-effort account. We cannot assume the compatibility of naturally oc
curring depression with a laboratory procedure for inducing sad mood, and
therefore this extension to samples of depressed subjects is an important
step in theorizing about depressive memory (see Ingram, 1989). If "ex
perimental depression" can effectively model natural depression in their
relation to memory, then the results from experiments that manipulate
mood might help us to make causal inferences about the relation of depres
sion and memory (cf. Riskind, 1989). But if the correspondence between
the types of depression is lacking, then conclusions from experiments
employing experimental inductions of mood are confined to that domain.

EXPERIMENT

In a frequently cited series of experiments on depressive deficits in
free recall, Ellis et al. (1984) used the Velten (1968) procedure to induce
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either depressed or neutral moods in college students, then presented them
with incidental learning tasks. In the learning phase of Experiment 3 subjects
were exposed to a sentence with a missing noun and asked to choose one
of two subsequently presented nouns to complete it. Across the 24 learning
trials the sentences varied according to the difficulty of completion, as as
sessed by independent ratings. (A less difficult frame for the word "dream"
was "The girl was awakened by her frightening
," compared to the
more difficult frame, "The man was alarmed by the frightening
.") Sub
sequently, experimentally depressed subjects recalled fewer words from the
difficult sentence frames than did nondepressed subjects. This finding was
interpreted to mean that depression reduces task-relevant processing, espe
cially in situations that require greater degrees of cognitive effort.
Although the materials used by Ellis et al. had been used in experi
ments demonstrating that greater degrees of cognitive effort were expended
during processing in more difficult contexts (Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, &
Ellis, 1979), their procedure did not include such measures. And so it is
not clear if depressed subjects actually failed to expend the effort required
by the difficult sentences (compared to the easy sentences). In Experiment
1 we investigated possible differences i n the allocation of attentional
resources by including attentional probes during the learning trials.
In brief, we selected subjects who had scored lower than 5 or higher
than 9 on two administrations of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI;
Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) 2-4 weeks apart. Our
depressed subjects were interviewed to ensure that their elevated BDI
scores reflected depression rather than other forms of psychopathology or
illness. Most subjects met Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) for major
or minor depression (Spitzer, Endicott, & Robins, 1978). The learning task
conformed to the methods of Tyler et al. ( 1 979, Experiment 4), but was
computer-implemented. It consisted of a series of trials on which the
presentation of a single word was followed by an incomplete sentence;
during 80% of these trials a brief tone was presented over earphones. The
subject's primary task was to decide if the word fit sensibly into the sen
tence, and the secondary task was to press a button in response to the
tone. The secondary tone-detection task served as a probe for the amount
of available resources (see Kahneman, 1973). Longer latencies to respond
to the tone are offered as indications that fewer resources are available
for tone detection; one assumes that they are either depleted by some
extra-experimental factor, such as depression, or that they are allocated in
greater proportion to the primary task.
__

__
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Method

Materials and Apparatus
Learning Task. The learning task consisted of 40 trials of sentence
completion. Each trial required the subject to view a word followed by a
sentence with one word missing and to decide if the word fit sensibly into
that sentence frame. Unknown to the subject at the outset, all words fit
sensibly into the corresponding frames. The 40 words were nouns high in
frequency, concreteness, and meaningfulness; their accompanying sentence
frames had been pretested for difficulty of completion (see Hertel, 1989).
Each word appeared with easy frames for approximately half of the subjects
in each condition of depression and with difficult frames for the others.
For example the word artist was sometimes followed by "The young man's
portrait was painted by the
. Other subjects saw arti<>l followed by
.
"The young man's physique was admired by the
The learning task was implemented on an TRS-80 computer. The
program began with the presentation of four practice trials that represented
each level of difficulty and tone delay. All trials began with the presentation
of a word at the top of the screen for 1 s. Its offset occurred simultaneously
with the onset of the sentence frame, which was centered on the screen
and remained exposed for 8 s. On 80% of the trials a weak but detectable
tone occurred at delays of 1, 2, 3, or 4 s after the onset of the frame. With
the offset of the sentence a question mark appeared and the trial was ter
minated by a key press. A blank screen lasting 1 s separated trials.
The 40 words were grouped into blocks of 10. Each block contained
four 5-letter words, four 6-letter words, one 7-letter word, and one 8-letter
word. Across subjects, words were maintained in these blocks as they
rotated through the 10 conditions obtained by crossing sentence difficulty
(easy vs. difficult) with tone delay (no tone, or a delay of 1, 2, 3, or 4 s
after the onset of the sentence). The order of tone delays was constant for
all subjects.
Depression Jnvent01y. Selection of subjects was based on their scores
on the BDl. The BDI consists of 2 1 items describing cognitive, affective,
and somatic symptoms of depression. Higher scores indicate depression.
__ "

__ "

Subjects and Design of Mood Conditions

Sixty subjects were recruited from a pool of approximately 200 volun
teers who filled out the BDI in their lower-division psychology classes at
Trinity University. Those volunteers who scored lower than 5 and higher
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than 9 were contacted again and asked to volunteer for an experiment on
word processing. All volunteers received extra credit in their courses in
exchange for participation.
Upon completion of the experimental tasks (2-4 weeks later), subjects
filled out the BDI a second time. Those whose scores had shifted out of
the range of the group in which they had started were excluded from data
analyses. Subjects who remained in the high-scoring group were interviewed
in order to determine whether they met RDC for depression. Approximate
ly one-third of these interviews were conducted by a graduate student in
psychology who was trained and supervised by a Ph.D.-Ievel psychologist.
The supervising psychologist conducted the remaining interviews and deter
mined the diagnostic category from notes taken on the subjects' responses.
Of the 40 subjects who began the experiment with high (depressed)
scores on the BDI, 17 remained for data analysis. Nineteen did not score
in the depressed range on the second administration, and four more sub
jects were determined not to be depressed on the basis of the interview.
Twelve of the remaining 17 subjects met full RDC for either major or
minor depression. Five met all but one of the criteria3 clinician was satisfied
that the subjects' BDI scores reflected depression rather than illness or
another form of psychopathology. Of the 20 subjects who began the ex
periment with low scores on the BDI, three shifted out of that range and
were therefore excluded.
Procedure

The experimenter began by reading the instructions for the learning
task. Subjects were informed that two different tasks would be performed
simultaneously: a primary sentence-completion task and a secondary task
of detecting an auditory signal. In the primary task subjects were in
structed to decide if the word presented at the top of the screen fit sen
sibly into the incomplete sentence presented below it. They were told to
wait until the question mark appeared at the end of each trial and then
repeat the word and the decision (by saying yes or no). They were also
informed that most trials would require a yes response, but that some
subjects would experience a few negative instances; therefore, they should
consider all decisions carefully. For the secondary task they were asked
3

Most of these subjects did not clearly meet the inclusion criterion of having either sought

help for their depression or suffered marked impairment in work or social functioning. We
counted this criterion as being met only when the subject either had sought formal counseling
or had experienced severe and unmistakable problems in functioning, such as being in danger
of failing school or of being fired from a job due to depressive impairments.
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Tuhle I. Mean Latencies (in Seconds) and Proportion Recalled (Experiment 1)0
Response measure
Latency
Mood
Nondepressed
Depressed

Recall

Easy

Difficult

Easy

0.54
0.64

0.62
0.68

.20
.30

Difficult
.28

.37

aNote. n = 17. Median latencies were averaged across subjects to produce mean latencies.
Recall was measured as the proportion of words repeated during the learning task that were
subsequently recalled.

to respond to the tone by pressing the button on a switch held in the
nondominant hand. Instructions emphasized pressing as quickly as pos
sible in response to the tone, but without sacrificing attention to the
primary task.
The experimenter answered any questions, fit the subjects with ear
phones (for tone presentation), and began the program. The four practice
trials preceding the learning trials provided an opportunity for further
clarification.
After the last learning trial, subjects worked multiplication problems
for 5 min, when the experimenter announced (for the first time) the test
of free recall. Subjects were asked to write down all the words they could
remember from the learning phase. When the subjects indicated that they
were finished they were asked to try harder to recall and to write at least
20 words, guessing if necessary.
After the experiment was completed, we obtained subjects' verbal
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores. The scores were available for 12 of
the 17 subjects in each condition of mood. They were obtained from univer
sity records in a manner than protected subjects' confidentiality.

Results

and

BDI and

Discussion

SAT Scores

Mean scores on the BDI administered at the end of the session were
1 .24 for nondepressed subjects and 16.47 for depressed subjects. SAT verbal
scores did not reliably differ according to mood group; the mean was 558 for
nondepressed subjects and 539 for depressed subjects.
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Latencies

The median latency (in centiseconds, or cs) to respond to the tone
was submitted to an analysis of variance, with a between-subjects factor
for mood group (depressed vs. nondepressed) and a within-subjects factor
for the difficulty of the sentence frame (easy vs. difficult). (For this and
subsequent analyses the significance level was set at .05.) The mean for
each condition is shown in the left half of Table I.
Median latencies were reliably longer when the tone occurred during
the more difficult sentence frames, F ( 1 , 32) = 10.66, MSe = 107.050.
This reliable main effect replicated previous results with these and similar
materials (Hertel, 1989; Tyler et a!., 1979). Median latencies were longer
in the depressed group than in the nondepressed group, F ( 1 , 32) = 4.44,
MSe = 5 1 9.596. Finally, the interaction of mood group and difficulty was
not reliable (p > .20).
The association of longer latencies with depression could be inter
preted in at least three ways. First, depressed subjects might experience
motor retardation. Second, while processing the materials in the primary
task, they might be engaged in depressive ruminations which would occupy
further attention and delay their responses to the tone. Third, they might
be processing the materials in the primary task in a more effortfully
elaborative or distinctive fashion, with no time for depressive thoughts. If
the last account is viable, then we should expect performance on the sub
sequent test of free recall to profit from the more effortful processing.
Recall

The proportion of words recalled out of those that were correctly
repeated during the learning trials served as the dependent variable. (The
very low number of errors in repeating the words did not reliably differ
according to mood.) Proportions were submitted to an analysis of variance,
with factors for mood group and sentence difficulty.
As expected, words were more likely to be recalled if they were
processed in more difficult sentence frames, F ( 1 , 32) = 1 0.04, MSe =
.021. And, consistent with the latency data, depressed subjects recalled
more words than did nondepressed subjects, F ( 1 , 32) = 4.46, MSe = .061.
This unexpected advantage for depressive recall did not interact with sen
tence difficulty; in contrast to the findings of Ellis et a!. ( 1 984), the effect
of sentence difficulty obtained in both groups.
The depressive advantage in free recall probably cannot be attributed
to higher verbal abilities among our depressed subjects, because they
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tended to score slightly lower than the nondepressed subjects on the SAT.
We have not, in fact, developed a post hoc explanation for the depressive
advantage, believing that it requires replication before such speculations
are worthwhile (see Hasher, Rose, Zacks, Sanft, & Doren, 1985, for a
similar finding and interpretation). Instead, it is important to note that ef
fort effects in free recall and response latencies were obtained for non
depressed and depressed subjects alike- that a deficit in the recall of words
from the more difficult contexts was clearly not experienced by naturally
depressed students as it had been by students induced to feel depressed
in the experiment by Ellis et al. ( 1 984).
EXPERIMENT 2

The results of Experiment 1 showed that, regardless of depression,
processing words in the more difficult sentences required more capacity
and produced better memory. In short, we found no evidence of memory
impairment for depressed individuals and failed to replicate the results of
Ellis et al. ( 1 984). What might account for the differences in findings? Our
methods differed from those of Ellis et al. in a number of ways. In Ex
periment 2, we attempted to bring the major differences into the context
of one study so that they could be examined systematically. We now
describe each type of difference and how its investigation was incorporated
into the design of Experiment 2.
In the first place, we employed diagnostic criteria and self-reported
indices to identify subjects with naturally occurring depression, whereas
Ellis et al. induced depressive moods. When they work, experimental in
ductions clearly produce a variety of effects on the individual, some of
which seem to mimic clinical depression. But as several reviewers (e.g.,
Blaney, 1986; Hasher et al., 1985) have noted, the use of induced moods
to model naturally occurring depression carries with it a number of poten
tial problems. Our intent was to address these issues by directly comparing
the levels of recall associated with experimental and natural depression.
To that end, a major aspect of our design was the concurrent manipulation
and selection of depressed moods. Three groups of subjects participated:
nondepressed subjects in a neutral mood, nondepressed subjects induced
to feel depressed, and naturally depressed subjects.
In the second place, the experimental procedures of our first experi
ment and of Ellis et al. ( 1 984) differed in the extent to which attention to
the words was required by the learning task. Ellis et al. presented sentence
frames and word pairs successively for 4 s each and allowed subjects to
choose the correct alternative at any point during presentation of the word
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pair. In contrast, we presented a word for 1 s only and followed it with
the sentence frame; after 8 s the frame disappeared, and the subjects were
required to report the word and the decision about its fit. Thus, our pro
cedure implicitly required that all subjects rehearse the word for the dura
tion of the trial, whereas the subjects in Ellis et al.'s experiment could
engage in further processing after the choice between words was made or
allow their minds to wander.
In the design of Experiment 2, we addressed the role of these differen
ces by manipulating the structure of the learning task. We repeated the
methods of Experiment 1 in the structured condition and loosened the
demands in the unstructured condition. Subjects in the unstructured cond
Ition were not required to maintain the target word in memory for the 8 s
of the trial; the word remained on the screen and the subjects reported their
decisions at any time during the display of the word and sentence frame.
Finally, we modified our use of the tone-detection task. In addition
to presenting probes on 80% of the learning trials, we included 15 baseline
trials of tone presentations prior to the learning trials, as well as another
15 trials afterward. The baseline trials were used to evaluate preexisting
differences in response latencies (as might be incurred by task-irrelevant
thinking or by motor retardation o n the part of depressed subjects).
Moreover, when baseline latencies are used as covariates, latencies to
respond to secondary-task tones during the learning trials should be more
clearly indicative of task-related efforts.
In summary, the design of Experiment 2 allowed us to compare find
ings obtained through the experimental induction of a depressed mood with
those obtained through the selection of natural depression. The design also
included a manipulation of task structure as a way of determining the
boundary conditions of depressive deficits. Finally, additional measures of
cognitive effort were taken in further tests of the cognitive-effort account.
·

Method

Materials and Apparatus
Group Definition and Mood-Induction Procedures. As in Experiment
1, we used the BDI to select subjects and categorize them as nondepressed
or depressed. Neutral, depressed, and elated moods were produced with
the aid of the Velten mood-induction procedure (Velten, 1968), a series
of statements that are read silently and aloud by the subject in isolation.
The subject is asked to try to adopt the mood that is represented by the
statements. In the case of the neutral induction, the 60 statements are
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(somewhat boring) facts. In the case of the depression induction, the 60
statements, many of which are written in the first person, become increas
ingly negative. The elation induction, administered to experimentally
depressed subjects at the end of the session, contains statements that are
increasingly positive about the self.
In previous experiments (Ellis, Thomas, McFarland, & Lane, 1985;
Hertel & Hardin, 1990), depressed moods have been successfully estab
lished by 30 statements (from the original 60 employed by Velten). We
employed the shorter version in this study and eliminated statements that
included any of our experimental words or referred to difficulties in remem
bering (to reduce demands for compliance).
The success of the experimental induction was assessed by asking sub
jects to complete the Depression Adjective Check List (DACL; Lubin,
1965), a list of positive- and negative-mood adjectives that are checked for
self description. A depression score is obtained by summing the endorsed
negative adjectives and the nonendorsed positive adjectives. Also, at the very
end of the session we administered a questionnaire on which we asked sub
jects to speculate about the nature of their mood during the experiment,
how long it had lasted, and whether they had described their mood accurate
ly on the DACL or had told us what they thought we wanted to find out.
Learning Task. ,The materials for the learning task were those used
in Experiment 1. However, we made several changes in the task itself: (a)
The task was programmed for an IBM-XT that presented tones without
the use of headphones. The tones occurred again on 80% of the trials, at
delays of 1, 2, 4, or 6 s following the onset of the sentence frame. (b) The
program inserted 15 trials of tones presented alone, prior to the 40 learning
trials, and another 15 baseline trials after the learning trials. (c) I n the
structured condition the word disappeared after 1 s (when the sentence
appeared), but in the unstructured condition the word remained exposed
for 9 s and offset with the sentence frame.
Subjects and Design of Mood Conditions
Selection. A total of 146 Trinity University students completed the
experiment; 117 volunteered in exchange for extra credit in their lower
division psychology classes. When we recruited subjects in this way, the
BDI was administered to large groups of volunteers in classroom settings.
Those volunteers who scored 5 or below and 9 or above were contacted
again and asked to volunteer for an experiment on word processing. At
the start of the individual sessions we administered the BDI a second time
to subjects whose first scores were 5 or below. If their second scores fell
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in the same range, we randomly assigned them to receive a neutral- or
depressed-mood induction (Velten, 1968). We dismissed the subjects who
were preselected as nondepressed but whose second scores fell beyond the
cutoff.
We obtained the second BDI scores of the subjects who initially
scored 9 or above somewhat differently, because we suspect that naturally
depressed subjects deflate their scores when they report to experimenters
in individual sessions. Subjects who initially scored 9 or above filled out
the second BDI at the end of the experimental session, together with an
interview form soliciting further information regarding the context of their
depressed mood. Having been told that these forms were being collected
for a different study, the naturally depressed subjects delivered them in a
sealed envelope to the department secretary. The data from these subjects
were not used if their second BDI scores or responses to the form did not
meet the specifications. These procedures have been used by Hertel and
Hardin ( 1990) and conform to Deardorff and Funabiki's ( 1 985) specifica
tions for identifying naturally depressed subjects.
In the second procedure for recruiting subjects, an additional 29 sub
jects were paid $5.00 each for participating. They were obtained through
summer-school classes in disciplines other than psychology and were there
fore not preselected on the basis of a first BDl. These subjects all filled
out the BDI at the beginning of the experimental session. Those who scored
5 or below were randomly assigned to a mood-induction procedure; those
who scored 9 or above received neutral-mood inductions and were given
the interview form at the end of the session. These subjects were evenly
distributed across the experimental groups.
Allrition. We discarded the data from 1 8 subjects whom we initially
thought to be naturally depressed, either because their second score on
the BDI was lower than 9 or because they indicated on the interview form
that they had not been depressed for much of the previous 2 weeks. Some
subjects, for example, revealed that they had not slept well for the past
few nights due to class assignments; lack of sleep could elevate scores o n
the BDI but not produce other symptoms o f depression.
We also eliminated the data from three nondepressed subjects who
received the neutral-mood induction but produced high DACL scores (in
the 20s), indicating that in spite of their low BDI scores they were ex
periencing a very negative mood. And finally the data from five experimen
tally depressed subjects were discarded on the basis of very low DACL
scores and a subsequent phone interview in which they denied having been
induced to feel depressed or lethargic.
The Final Sample. Data from 120 subjects remained to be analyzed;
34 subjects were male (the number in each condition ranged from 5 to 7).
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The 40 naturally depressed subjects all scored 9 or above on the in-session
BDI and reported on the interview form having been depressed for the
past 2 weeks. The 40 experimentally depressed subjects each reported in
a telephone interview that the induction procedure produced either depres
sion or lethargy (or their DACL scores were in the range of others' scores).
The assignment of subjects to learning tasks and mood inductions was
random within blocks determined by initial BDI cutoff and gender (with
the exception that data from ineligible subjects were replaced when in
eligibility was determined). Within each between-subjects condition, two
subject were assigned to each of the 10 counterbalancing conditions of the
learning task.
Procedure

Subjects who had scored 5 or below on the first administration of the
BDI (and all subjects who had not been pretested) filled out the BDI at
the start of the session, sealed it in an envelope, and gave it to the ex
perimenter, who left the room ostensibly to prepare the next task but in
stead scored the BDl. If the score was 5 or below she assigned the subject
to a treatment condition (neutral or depressed induction and unstructured
or structured orienting task.) If the BDI score fell between 5 and 9 the
subject was told that he or she was part of a control group and was dis
missed. If the score on the first administration was 9 or above the subject
was assigned to receive a neutral induction (so that these subjects would
be treated like the nondepressed subjects). The induction procedure lasted
approximately 1 5 min and was followed by the DACL, to assess the
subject's mood.
The instructions and procedure for the learning and recall tasks con
formed to those used in Experiment 1 , with the following exceptions: (a)
Some instructions were presented on the computer screen. (b) Fifteen
baseline trials of tone detection occurred before and after the 40 learning
trials. (c) Subjects were asked to press any key (with a finger on the non
dominant hand) in response to the tone. (d) The subjects assigned to the
unstructured condition of the learning task were told to report their
decision about the fit of the word as soon as they made it, whereas subjects
in the structured condition were required to wait until the question mark
appeared to report the decision and repeat the word. Word repetition was
not required in the unstructured task.
A second administration of the DACL followed the recall test. Then
experimentally depressed subjects underwent an induction of elation. All
subjects completed the final questionnaire as part of their debriefing. At
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Tuhle II. Mean Scores on Mood Indices (Experiment

2)0

Mood
Measure
BD!b

b
DACL
First
Second

Nondepressed

Experimental

Naturally depressed

2.2

2.1

15.2

6.6

15.1
9.9

11.8
15.0
3.2

8.0

Final questionnaire
Sadness

2.0

3.6

l..cthargy
Distraction

3.5

4.6

4.8

3.5

4.4
4.0

5.2
4.1

Unstructured
Structured

4.1

0Note. Means were computed on scores from

40 subjects, with the following exceptions. DACL

second administration for nondeprcsscd: 11 = 34. Distraction means: 11 = 20.
bBDI = Beck Depression Inventory; DACL = Depression Adjective Check List.

the end of the session, naturally depressed subjects were given the BDI (if
they had not taken it at the start of the session) and interview forms to
fill out and turn in to the department secretary. Experimentally depressed
subjects were carefully quizzed about their moods before dismissal; they
were also phoned on a subsequent day and asked if the depressed induction
had worked and if it had lasted beyond the session. (All subjects reported
that they left the session in a reasonably good mood.)
Results and Discussion
Mood Indices and SAT
BDI and DACL Scores. The naturally depressed students showed
moderate levels of depression, on the average (mean BDI = 15.2, vs 2.2
for the nondepressed students). Naturally depressed male students tended
to report lower levels of depression than did female students (M = 1 1 .2
vs 16.8, respectively).
Table II presents the mean DACL scores. As can be seen in the table,
the naturally depressed subjects began the learning task in a slightly better
mood than did the experimentally depressed subjects. Yet by the time of
recall the difference was reversed, the naturally depressed subjects reported
more depressed feelings than did the other two groups, who reported
similar feeling states. An analysis of variance performed on the DACL
scores revealed a reliable interaction of mood group with the time of ad-
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ministration (before the learning task versus after recall), F (2, 108) =
31.71, MSe = 12.253. (Note that the second DACL was not administered
to 6 nondepressed subjects, due to experimenter error.)
We also found a reliable three-way interaction of gender, mood
group, and time of administration, F (2, 108) = 3.35, MSe = 1 1 .994. The
interaction of depression with time of administration described above was
exaggerated for male students, but still obtained for female students.
Final Questionnaire. A section of this form asked subjects to characterize
their mood during the computer task and presented a list of adjectives, each
of which was followed by a rating continuum anchored by not at all (1) and
extremely (7). Ratings for happy (after reversing the direction), sad, and blue
were averaged to constitute the dimension of sadness. Ratings for tired, lethar
gic, and sleepy were averaged to constitute a measure of lethargy. And dis
traction was made up of ratings for distracted and Did your mind wander?
Means on these three dimensions are presented in Table II.
Mood-dimension scores were submitted to analyses of variance, with
factors for mood group and learning task. Scores on the sadness dimension
differed according to depression, F (2, 112) = 14.39, MSe = 1.822; the two
depressed groups did not differ reliably and both indicated more sadness
than did the nondepressed group. Similarly, a reliable main effect of mood
group on lethargy scores indicated that the two depressed groups reported
feeling more tired than did the nondepressed group, F (2, 113) = 7.77,
MSe = 2.286.
In Table II, mean distraction scores are broken down according to
learning task (unstructured vs. structured) in order to reveal the nature of
the reliable interaction of task structure with mood group, F (2, 114) =
3.27, MSe = 1.971. The two depressed groups reported feeling more dis
tracted than did nondepressed subjects, but only if they had received the
unstructured learning task.
The final questionnaire also inquired about the duration of the mood
that was characterized on the adjective dimensions. The rating scale ranged
from stopped immediately (1) to still feel this way (7). A main effect of mood
group revealed that the moods of experimentally depressed subjects (M =
3.4) changed more than the moods of the nondepressed subjects (M = 4.9)
and the naturally depressed subjects (M = 4.8), F (2, 114) = 10.66, MSe =
2.589.
Finally, we attempted to assess demand characteristics of the DACL
by asking subjects to rate the extent to which they had felt the same as
they had indicated on the DACL (jelL the same = 1 ; felt very different =
7), rather than complied with what they thought the experimenter wanted.
No reliable differences between groups were revealed; M = 1.5.
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Table Ill. Mean Latencies (in Seconds Adjusted by Baseline Latencies (Experiment 2)0
Learning task

Structured

Unstructured
Mood
Nondepressed
Experimentally depressed
Naturally depressed
0Note.

n =

Easy

Difficult

Easy

Diflicu lt

47

.52

48

.

.51
.46

.59
.54

.

.55

.

.

46

.

52
50

.61

20.

SAT Scores. We procured the scores on the verbal component of the
SAT for 110 of the subjects (18· or 19 in each experimental condition).
SAT scores did not differ according to experimental condition, nor were
they reliably related to BDI scores, total recall, or the difference in recall
between difficult and easy trials.
Lalencies
Baseline Trials. The median time in milliseconds (ms) to respond to
the tone during the baseline trials was submitted to an analysis of variance,
with between-subjects factors for the structure of the learning task (un
structured vs. structured) and mood (nondepressed vs. experimental vs.
natural), and a within-subjects factor for when the trials occurred (before
vs. after the learning task). .:rhe only reliable effect indicated that all sub
jects responded more quickly on the 15 trials at the end of the learning
task than they did on the 15 trials at the beginning (M = 343 ms vs. 358),
F (1, 114) = 5.71, MSe = 2377.94. Evidently, these experimentally and
naturally depressed college students did not experience motor retardation
or other limitations that would delay responses to the tones.
Learning Trials. The median time in milliseconds to respond during
the learning trials was submitted to an analysis of covariance, with factors
for task structure, mood (between-subjects), and sentence difficulty (within
subjects). The average of the baseline medians (pre- and postlearning trials)
served as the covariate for analyses of between-subjects effects. As ex
pected, baseline latencies were reliably correlated with learning-trial laten
cies, R = .67, F (1, 113) = 93.38, MSe = 33755.87. Second, longer latencies
were observed in the structured task, F (1, 113) = 5.31, MSe = 33755.87.
Third, longer latencies occurred during the difficult sentences, F (1, 114) =
32.43, MSe = 5301.48. No reliable differences were associated with mood.
For each condition the mean of the median latencies, adjusted by baseline
latencies, is presented in Table III.
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Tuhle IV. Mean Number of Words Recalled

(Experime nt 2)0

Learning task

St ructured

Unstructured
Mood

Easy

Difficult

Easy

Difficult
5.6

Nondepressed

3.0

5.5

4.6

Experimentally depressed
Naturally depressed

3.3

4.4

3.8

4.7

3.3

4.8

3.2

5.8

0Note.

n

=

20.

Additional analyses of the latency data included factors for gender
and for the position of the tone during the trial (1 or 2 s vs. 4 or 6 s after
the onset of the sentence). These factors did not reliably interact with other
factors in the design. (The factor for gender also failed to produce reliable
effects in the analysis of recall data and therefore wa.s excluded in the
results reported below.)
Recall

The number of words correctly recalled was submitted to an analysis
of variance with between-subjects factors for mood and the structure of
the learning task, and a within-subjects factor for the difficulty of the sen
tence frames. A reliable main effect of task structure showed that requiring
rehearsal of the words improved overall recall, F (1, 1 1 4) = 5.01, MSe =
3.958. Also, a reliable main effect of difficulty replicated the usual finding
that words evaluated in the more difficult sentences were better recalled,
F (1, 1 1 4) = 59.09, MSe = 2.519.
These main effects, however, were attenuated by the reliable three
way interaction of difficulty, structure, and mood group, F (2, 1 1 4) = 3.35,
MSe = 2.519. Table IV presents the mean number of words recalled in
each condition. We evaluated this interaction through a series of planned
comparisons among the mood groups, in order to reveal the conditions
under which the findings of Ellis et al. (1984, Experiment 3) and those of
Experiment 1 in this report were replicated.
First, we examined comparisons between nondepressed and ex
perimentally depressed subjects. [In contrast to neutral-mood subjects, Ellis
et al.'s (1984) experimentally depressed subjects recalled fewer words and
did not show the effect of sentence difficulty.] Our analyses revealed that
an induction of depression caused an overall deficit in recall, F (1, 114) =
3.95, MSe = 3.958. Within the unstructured condition (the condition that
was roughly comparable with Ellis et al.), the effect of sentence difficulty
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tended to be greater for nondepressed subjects than for experimentally
depressed subjects, as indicated by a marginally reliable simple interaction,
F (1, 114) = 3.62, MSe = 2.519, p < .06. Finally, experimentally depressed
subjects in our structured task tended to recall fewer words overall than
did the nondepressed subjects, F (1, 114) = 3.87, MSe = 3.958, p < .06.
No other effects involving the comparison of these two groups came close
to reaching significance. We conclude that the results of Ellis et al. (1984)
were essentially replicated with experimentally depressed subjects.
Second, we examined the difference in recall between nondepressed and
naturally depressed subjects. An overall deficit was not reliably obtained, but
the difference between the two groups did reliably interact with sentence dif
ficulty and task structure, F (1, 114) = 6.71, MSe = 2.519. Within the unstruc
tured task, no reliable main effect or interaction was associated with natural
depression. However, within the structured task, naturally depressed subjects
recalled fewer words from ea.\y sentences but similar numbers of words from
difficult sentences, as shown by the reliable interaction of sentence difficulty
with the comparison of nondepressed vs. natural depression, F (1, 114) = 4.77,
MSe = 2.519. The mechanisms that produced this interaction are unclear to
us, but the important outcome was the lack of depressive deficit in recalling
words from difficult sentences. Thus, although the results of Experiment 2 failed
to replicate the depressive advantage found in Experiment 1, they also failed
to produce evidence of a reliable deficit associated with natural depression.
Third, in order to examine the basis for concluding that experimentally
and naturally depressed subjects might perform differently, comparisons be
tween those two conditions were made. They revealed a marginally reliable
interaction of this comparison with sentence difficulty, F (1, 114) = 3.58, MSe
= 2.519, p < .06. The effect of difficulty was larger for the naturally depressed
subjects than· for the induced subjects. Furthermore, this effect clearly reached
significance in the structured task, F (1, 114) = 5.08, MSe = 2.519.

EXPERIMENT 3

In the unstructured condition of Experiment 2, naturally depressed
subjects appeared to show a tendency toward lower recall of words from
difficult sentences, compared to their nondepressed counterparts. This ten
dency did not approach statistical significance; nevertheless we were dis
satisfied with a conclusion that emphasized the failure to find a naturally
depressed deficit while performance in that condition seemed relatively low.
We also realized that our method for the unstructured condition yet
departed from the methods of Ellis et al. (1984) in that ours included a
secondary task and theirs did not. The secondary task might mobilize the
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attention that depressed subjects might otherwise allocate in a task-ir
relevant manner (see Krames & McDonald, 1985; Williams, Watts, Mac
Leod, & Mathews, 1988). In order to address these concerns, Experiment
3 was conducted.
In Experiment 3 nondepressed and naturally depressed subjects par
ticipated in a learning phase that was identical to the unstructured task in
Experiment 2, with the exception that the secondary task was eliminated.
Other departures from the method of Experiment 2 included the elimina
tion of the mood-induction procedure and a modification of the recall task.
When subjects indicated they were finished recalling, the experimenter
drew a line below the last word written and requested additional effort in
recall until the subjects had written at least 20 words. The change from
Experiment 2 was the drawing of the line. This change was implemented
so that we could evaluate the level of recall before and after the request
to continue was made. Ellis et al. (1984, Experiment 3) had encouraged
guessing but not required it. Perhaps naturally depressed subjects recall at
higher levels only when they are required to guess. (See Dunbar & Lish
man, 1984, for evidence of a conservative bias in depression.)
Method
Subjects

As in Experiments 1 and 2, 25 subjects were selected on the basis of
their scores from a first administration of the BDI, obtained approximately
1 0 days before the experimental session. Those who scored 9 or above were
assigned to the depressed group and those who scored 5 or below to the
nondepressed group. The data from five subjects were discarded on the
basis of the second BDI score and interview form, both of which were ob
tained at the end of the session. Two initially nondepressed subjects had
moved beyond the cutoff for the BDI and produced DACL scores above
11. Three initially depressed subjects produced second BDI scores that fell
below 9 or claimed not to be depressed on the interview form. Of the
remaining 10 subjects in each condition of mood, two were men.
Materials and Procedure

Immediately after informed consent, subjects participated in the learn
ing task. One subject in each condition of mood was assigned to each of
the 10 counterbalancing conditions (related to word order and to the as
signment of words to level of sentence difficulty). The materials and proce-
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dure for the learning task conformed to those for the unstructured task of
Experiment 2, but the secondary task was eliminated and no tones occurred.
After the 5-min distraction task (arithmetic problems), the ex
perimenter requested free recall of the words. When the subjects reported
that they were finished, she drew a line below the last word and requested
that they try to recall at least 20 words, by guessing if necessary. She in
formed them that guessing often pays off in a correct response.
The recall task was followed by an administration of the DACL and
a shortened version of the final questionnaire from Experiment 2. Last, sub
jects were asked to fill out the BDI and the interview form, seal them in
an envelope, and deliver them to the departmental office. The envelope was
marked with a subject-identification number, but the forms were anonymous.
Results and Discussion

Mood Indices

The mean BDI score on second administration was 1.0 for non
depressed subjects and 17.0 for depressed subjects. The corresponding
mean DACL scores were 5.6 and 10.8, respectively, and significantly dif
fered, F (1, 18) = 5.22, MSe = 25.889. On the final questionnaire,
depressed subjects reported feeling more distracted than nondepressed sub
jects (M = 3.8 and 1.6, respectively), F (1, 17) = 8.60, MSe = 2.385.
Depressed subjects also felt more lethargic (M = 3.2) than did non
depressed subjects (M = 2.4), F (1, 17) = 6.44, MSe = .652. (No apparent
gender differences were obtained for measures of mood or recall.)
Recall

The number of words recalled was submitted to an analysis of variance
with a between-subjects factor for mood and within-subjects factors for sen
tence difficulty and type of recall (free vs. forced). Table V shows the mean
for each cell in the design. The analysis revealed an advantage of words
processed in difficult sentences, F (1, 18) = 5.40, MSe = 3.003, but this effect
of sentence difficulty depended on the type of recall, F (1, 18) = 8.39,
MSe = 1 .525. The effect of difficulty was greater under free recall conditions
(i.e., before guessing was required), perhaps because few numbers of words
were produced by the forcing procedure. Also, in a few cases free recall levels
neared the cutoff of 20 words, such that few words had to be forced in order
for these subjects to reach the final criterion. Obviously, subjects recalled
more words under conditions of free recall, F (1, 18) = 19.93, MSe = 6.525.
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Table V. Mean Number of Words Recalled (Experiment 3)0
Type of recall
Forced

Free
Mood
Nondepressed
Depressed
0Note.

n

=

Total

Easy

Difficult

Easy

3.5

4.7

1.5

1.6

5.0

6.3

5.0

1.3

1.4

4.1

6.4

2.8

Difficult

Easy

Difficult

10.

No reliable differences according to mood were obtained. Even the
apparent interaction of mood with difficulty did not approach significance
(p > .50). These results confirmed that under conditions very similar to
those employed by Ellis et al. ( 1 984, Experiment 3) no depressive deficit
obtained. Although the secondary task may have mobilized attention and
prevented depressive musings in the first two experiments, removing that
task did not produce a depressive deficit in subsequent recall.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results from these experiments are among the first to validate
concerns about the adequacy of experimental inductions as models of
naturally occurring depression in the realm of memory research (see In
gram, 1989; Riskind, 1989). Specifically, the data do not support an exten
sion of the cognitive-effort account to the domain of recall by naturally
depressed students. In the ensuing discussion we first review the effects of
task difficulty. We then propose possible explanations for the Jack of cor
respondence between the effects of experimental depression and the dif
ferences associated with natural depression. Last, we summarize the
relations of our findings to the cognitive-effort account of depressive
deficits in remembering.
Task

Difficulty

Performance on the secondary tone-detection task in Experiments 1
and 2 showed that attentional resources of depressed and nondepressed
subjects alike were allocated in greater proportion to the words evaluated
in the difficult sentences, compared to the easy sentences. And, as has been
the case in other experiments that used these materials and tasks (Hertel,
1 989; Tyler et al., 1979), words from the difficult sentences were better
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recalled by all mood groups. Compared to the easy sentence frames, the
difficult sentence frames seemed to have invited more effortful procedures
which, in turn, produced better recall (see McDaniel, Einstein, & Lollis,
1988; Mitchell & Hunt, 1 989).
In Experiment 3 we took an additional step in bringing the conditions
of the learning task in line with those of Ellis et al. (1984) by removing
the secondary task, which might have mobilized attention and stimulated
more task-related effort from naturally depressed subjects. Yet effects of
task difficulty on recall were obtained for both mood groups, without
evidence of a depressive deficit. We have not taken the last step, which is
to alter the learning task so that subjects choose between two words, as
did Ellis et al., but we cannot imagine why deficits would obtain following
choice procedures and not verification.
Effects of Experimental Depression

One constraint on the general finding of effects of task difficulty on
recall was provided by experimentally depressed subjects in Experiment 2.
These subjects did not produce as large an effect as the ones obtained for
nondepressed and naturally depressed subjects. Why would subjects who
experience a transitory depressed mood perform differently from naturally
depressed subjects?
One possible reason why lower levels of performance might be caused
by inductions is related to the severity of the depressed mood (see Johnson
& Magaro, 1 987). It might be argued that the induction technique produces
a more extreme depressive state than what is experienced by naturally
depressed students (see Ellis & Ashbrook, 198X). The scores on the DACL
in Experiment 2 do suggest that depression-induced subjects had more
negative feelings immediately following the induction than did naturally
depressed subjects. But because that difference was not statistically reliable
and because the moods of the naturally depressed subjects were more nega
tive at the time of recall, the poor performance of experimentally depressed
subjects probably cannot be attributed to a more severe mood impairment.
Another explanation for differences between the two types of depres
sive groups is related to possible differences in prior experience in mood
management. As argued by Rude and Hertel (1987), mood inductions are
very recent experiences, whereas a depressed mood characterized at least
2 weeks of experience for our naturally depressed subjects. Naturally
depressed college students may develop coping strategies to aid their per
formance in cognitive tasks, whereas experimentally depressed subjects are
less likely to benefit from prior experience in managing their mood, espe-
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cially if the mood is particularly acute. Experimental techniques perhaps
induce moods that are more acute (if not more severe) than moods that
are experienced naturally (Ingram; personal communication, July 13,
1990).
Next, following Rude and Hertel (1987), we considered motivational
factors that might have influenced the performance of experimentally
depressed subjects. A focus on possible demand characteristics of the in
duction procedure suggests that experimentally depressed subjects might
believe that we expect poor performance from them. Why else would we
ask them to feel depressed and then administer a learning task? This ar
gument is pertinent even when the induction procedure seems to have es
tablished an alteration in mood. The point is that when a subject is faced
with the choice between continuing serious attempts to recall vs. writing
down enough words to total 20, experimentally depressed subjects can opt
for the latter without any loss of self-esteem. They can blame their poor
performance on our induction procedure. Naturally depressed subjects, in
contrast, have no excuse for poor performance.
In short, whenever differences in attributions, differences in prior ex
perience in mood management, or both are likely to affect performance,
induction procedures may provide poor models of natural depression. In
gram ( 1989) has pointed to additional factors that could encourage faulty
inferences about the modelling of depressive memory through laboratory
manipulations. They include the possibility that experimental techniques
produce moods that lack associated features of depression. We suggest that
the associated features could, in some contexts, ameliorate depressive
deficits.
A few final comments about our methods of assigning subjects to
mood groups are in order. First, we used a relatively low cutoff point on
the BDI for selecting subjects for the nondepressed control groups. Ken
dall, Hollon, Beck, Hammen, and Ingram ( 1987) advised that such a
method does not permit generalization to "normal" populations, given that
very low scores on the BDI might indicate abnormal cheerfulness or even
some forms of psychopathology. Because we did not interview non
depressed subjects we cannot rule out the presence of hypomania,
psychopathy, or extreme cheerfulness. A related limitation is that we did
not formally assess the reliability of our RDC decisions concerning the
depressed subjects. However, we took a relatively conservative approach
to counting subjects' responses as meeting criteria for depression. This ap
proach, together with the procedure of repeated BDI assessments, en
hanced our confidence that our naturally depressed subjects were indeed
depressed.
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The Cognitive-Effort Account

The cognitive-effort account of depressive deficits in recall implies a
pervasive alloc�tion of cognitive resources to depression. How does this
interpretation fare in accounting for the present results on naturally occur
ring depression? In Experiment 1, depressed subjects took longer to
respond to the tone and recalled higher percentages of words than did
nondepressed subjects. Although we did not replicate this depressive ad
vantage in the subsequent experiments, it was an important finding. The
similar patterns in latencies and recall suggested that depressives' attention
was allocated to the primary task, rather than being limited by depression.
In Experiment 2 baseline and secondary-task latencies did not differ
according to naturally occurring mood. Subsequently, the two groups
recalled similar numbers of words, with the exception of one anomalous
finding. The structured learning task produced a (naturally) depressive
deficit in the recall of words from the ea.\y sentences, but not from the
difficult sentences. It appears that naturally depressed subjects had suffi
cient resources available for processing and recalling words from difficult
contexts. It is therefore hard to understand how they would lack sufficient
resources to process the words in easy contexts.
Our research suggests greater flexibility in resource allocation than
what has been previously believed about depressive cognition. Rather than
focusing on the availability of resources, accounts of depressive memory
should emphasize the allocation of resources (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1 988),
which is influenced by the requirements of cognitive tasks and the extra
experimental context for performing them. For example, college students
are accustomed to performing tasks of the sort that we have used.
Moreover, all of our learning tasks were somewhat structured from the
perspective of people who are still functional in a college setting. They do
not invite a significant degree of initiative in resource allocation, the Jack
of which might lead depressed students to perform poorly in other arenas
(see Hertel & Hardin, 1990). But tasks such these might indeed be affected
by reduced initiative in resource allocation if they were performed by clini
cally depressed patients.
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